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1. Overview of Issues
Economic instruments (EIs) encompass a rather heterogeneous toolkit of policies whose main defining 
feature is their reliance on markets and the price mechanism to internalise environmental externalities 
and thereby make polluters pay. In other words, these instruments "leave decentralised agents their 
freedom of choice, of decision and of trade, while at the same time affecting the schedule of advantages 
and disadvantages associated with the consequences of those choices" (Godard 1994).
The discussion of the relative merits of EIs as policy instruments is normally framed in terms of a 
contrast with the conventional approach applied in most countries virtually since the inception of 
environmental policy, viz., a reliance on laws and regulations which dictate in some detail the measures 
which polluters must adopt under penalty of fines or other sanctions. This approach, which is referred to 
as "command-and-control" (CAC), has been criticised by economists on grounds of both static and 
dynamic inefficiency: the former because it requires compliance with the same standards by all pollution 
sources, irrespective of marginal compliance costs; the latter because it provides little incentive to 
technical improvement once compliance has been achieved.
For the policy maker, the economic efficiency of a particular policy instrument is only one selection 
criterion, however important. Once other relevant criteria are introduced, then trade-offs must be 
considered, and EIs are no longer necessarily the preferred candidate. For instance, if minimising 
exposure to a highly toxic substance is the policy objective, strict CAC measures -- including perhaps 
an outright ban on production/sale of the substance -- may be preferred over a policy which would 
discourage use through a seemingly prohibitive product tax. Another consideration is that what is optimal 
in theory may be of limited relevance if there is little possibility of implementing the optimal policy.
As governments acquire more experience in applying economic instruments, they are also learning more 
about the difficulties of implementing specific instruments. This applies as much to OECD countries as to 
developing countries. Still, the literature dealing with problems of implementation and how to overcome 
those problems is sparse. One of the first and most comprehensive explorations of implementation 
strategies for environmental taxes in OECD countries is OECD (1996). For developing countries, 
where experience with such instruments is admittedly more limited, there has as yet been virtually no 
comparable work. This paper is intended to begin filling this gap.
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deficiencies can be of a few sorts. One occurs when the instrument is overly complex, requiring 
sophisticated technical capabilities on the part of those charged with its implementation. Another occurs 
when instrument design is insensitive to the political dimension of successful implementation -- i.e., the 
impact on and likely reaction of powerful interest groups. Implementation problems may also arise from
a weak legal and institutional framework. For instance, certain instruments presuppose a clear 
assignment and enforcement of property rights; others require an effective tax administration; still others 
may rely on a well-functioning financial system. These legal/institutional prerequisites do not always exist 
in developing countries. Thus, instrument selection needs to be informed by an assessment of the 
institutional or other parameters which affect implementation. Another sort of implementation problem 
occurs when there is a mismatch between the instrument chosen and the nature of the environmental
problem to be addressed: e.g., when applying an instrument requires close monitoring of polluters, but 
the large number, small size and geographic dispersion of those polluters makes such monitoring 
prohibitively expensive if not impossible. 
The set of instruments available to policy makers is an open one. Seldom is environmental policy choice 
dichotomous: either an emission standard or an emission tax. Various combinations of instruments are 
possible and very often regulatory measures are combined with economic incentives in a way which 
seeks to exploit the advantages of each. The flexibility of instrument design and the possibility of creating 
"hybrid" instruments are distinct advantages where policy makers aim to achieve a balance among
competing objectives -- e.g., efficiency, effectiveness and equity (see O'Connor and Turnham 1992).
Besides CAC and EIs, a third type of instrument should be mentioned. Suasive instruments (SIs) rely 
on voluntary compliance by polluters, motivated either by the threat of adverse or the prospective of 
favourable publicity. Environmental education and awareness raising are key elements of any policy
designed around SIs. If people are willing to act on their preferences for a clean environment -- e.g., by 
choosing to buy products with an "eco-label" or boycotting the products of firms known as serious 
polluters -- then this may be enough inducement for firms to improve environmental performance.
Formalising a commitment to reduce pollution in a voluntary agreement (whether with government, with 
a non-governmental organisation, or with a citizens' association) may reinforce the credibility of that 
commitment. If SIs have certain advantages over other types of instrument -- particularly in the modest 
demands they place on government enforcement -- they also have drawbacks, viz.., they can involve 
high transactions costs when many small polluters are involved and are wholly unsuitable for certain 
types of pollution (e.g., non-point source) (see O'Connor 1994, pp.134-135).
This paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we briefly review the experience with the 
implementation of economic instruments in both OECD countries and developing countries. The types 
of instruments considered are: pollution taxes/charges, product taxes/charges, deposit-refund schemes, 
and tradable permits. Also, the related practices of earmarking revenues from EIs and creating 
specialised environmental funds are considered. In section 3, a general framework is presented for 
evaluating alternative instruments in terms of their ease of implementation, and in the final section some 
suggestions are advanced for addressing the more common implementation problems. The question of
how environmental policy affects competitiveness in an open economy is also briefly considered.
2. Experience with Applying Economic Instruments
Actual practice in applying EIs departs in virtually all cases from pure theory, reflecting the need to 
accommodate instruments to the complexities of the real world. In some cases this means mixing 
elements of CAC, EIs and/or SIs in order to realise multiple objectives; in other cases it means
modifying the design or phasing the introduction of a particular instrument to make it more politically 
acceptable. As a rule, environmental policy makers operate in a "second-best" world. 
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Moreover, while the primary concern is with implementation, this is not a systematic evaluation of the 
environmental effectiveness or cost efficiency of specific instruments in practice. There are very few such 
evaluations on which to report (with the exception of some cost assessments of tradable permit schemes 
in the United States, cited in Hahn 1989). In future, as experience with EIs accumulates, there will 




An inventory of EIs in use in OECD countries as of the beginning of 1992 shows that product charges 
are most common (79 examples in 20 countries), followed by emission charges (70 examples in 21 
countries). Other instruments follow at some distance: 33 examples of deposit-refund schemes in 16 
countries, only 12 examples of tradable permit schemes, 8 of which are found in the United States, and 
8 examples of enforcement incentives (Barde 1994). Thus, as of 1992, a total of 169 EIs were being 
used in 23 OECD countries. Product charges and deposit-refund schemes were the two instruments 
The OECD Experience
The experience of OECD countries with applying EIs has been studied more extensively than that 
of developing countries. In reviews of that experience, one recurrent question has been what are 
the conditions for (obstacles to) effective implementation of specific EIs. Since some of the same 
problems with implementation encountered by OECD countries could be expected to recur in 
developing countries should the latter adopt similar instruments, it is worth considering how 






It is noteworthy that, even in OECD countries, experience with the application of EIs was rather limited 
until a decade ago. An early OECD review (1989) of EIs in 15 member countries (as of 1987) found 
examples of approximately 100 EIs in use, but the conclusion was that very few actually had any 
incentive effect and that, by and large, environmental management systems could still be characterised as 
dominated by command-and-control policies with some financial and economic add-ons.
A more recent look at OECD experience since 1989 (see OECD 1994b) finds an increased reliance on 
EIs. Among the more important reasons given are:
A general tendency towards de-regulation of economic activity and greater reliance on markets and 
the private sector;
Tighter budget constraints facing governments, which has stimulated an interest in instruments that are 
designed with "built-in" compliance incentives and that can also raise revenue;
Within the environmental arena, a growing concern with problems which do not end themselves 
readily to CAC approaches -- e.g., diffuse and mobile sources of pollution and global pollution 
problems;
Also, sharply increasing costs of pollution control as governments and their constituencies seek 
continued environmental improvements from what has already become a rather strong baseline 
performance in many OECD countries.
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countries surveyed in both years). There is no tendency, however, in OECD countries towards 
replacing the basic command-and-control approach with a purely economic one. "Economic 
instruments are complements mostly and substitutes only sometimes for other types of approaches" 
(OECD, 1994b, p.187).
Pollution charges and charge-rebate schemes
Implementation problems with pollution charges are of two sorts: political and technical. The political 
problem can arise from three sources: general opposition from taxpayers to tax increases; opposition 
from the polluters, whose costs would normally be increased; opposition when the charge is perceived 
to be inequitably distributed -- e.g., if low-income households pay proportionally more. The first source 
of political opposition (and to a degree the second) can be addressed through designing a tax that 
maintains revenue neutrality. 
 In its broader connotation (i.e., substituting eco-taxes for distortionary ones while 
holding total revenue constant), revenue neutrality may be a way of reducing taxpayer-voter opposition 
to a new charge. Another sense of revenue neutrality is to redistribute the revenue from the tax (levied, 
e.g., on emissions) to all those paying the tax, but in proportion to their production (Godard 1994). In 
this way, the externality is internalised in a way that transfers revenue from more- to less-polluting 
enterprises but without redistributing revenue away from the polluting industry per se. This approach is 
used by Sweden, for example, in the case of its nitrous oxide (NO ) emission charge on large heat and 
power generators. The tax is proportional to emissions while the rebate is proportional to energy or 
electricity produced. Thus, a power plant whose emissions per unit of electricity generated are above 
average has an incentive to reduce its emissions factor. The scheme is revenue neutral with respect to 
the affected industry as a whole so, in theory, it should generate little political opposition. 
Revenue neutrality.
x
 In OECD countries that have experimented with eco-tax measures, 
distributional impacts have been a major political issue. Thus, policy packages have often included an 
explicit compensation mechanism aimed at adversely affected groups (OECD, 1996, chap.4). In 
analysing distributional impacts of a pollution tax/charge, the following need to be considered: (i) its 
effective incidence (who ultimately pays the tax?); (ii) the relevant baseline for comparison (the 
 or an alternative instrument to achieve the same environmental goal?); (iii) the dimension of 
distribution that is of particular interest -- e.g., across income groups, across types of firm/industry, 




Much of the empirical evidence on the distributional impact of environmental taxes in OECD countries 
relates to carbon taxes (see Poterba 1991 for the USA, Pearson and Smith 1991 for the UK, and Scott
1991 for Ireland); studies of impacts on different income/expenditure groups suggest varying degrees of 
regressivity. While the results from these studies cannot be assumed to hold for developing countries, it 
is plausible that the regressivity of a carbon tax would be even greater in developing countries. This 
could be the case, for example, where the poor rely for cooking and heating on coal while the wealthy 
prefer gas and oil (with their lower CO  emission factors).  2
Carbon taxes are probably not on the near-term political agenda of most developing countries, so these 
studies are of limited relevance. Other types of environmental taxes in OECD countries have been 
studied less, but there has been some research on the distributional effects of motor fuel taxes (cff. 
Poterba, 1989, for the USA; Johnson, McKay and Smith, 1990, for the UK). Opposing tendencies 
appear for the two countries -- regressive incidence for the USA and progressive for the UK -- which 
probably reflects in part the relative availability of substitutes to private motorised transport.
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of whether and how to compensate the losers arises. The likelihood that compensation will be paid 
would appear to be greatest where the impact is sizeable and clearly traceable to that policy, and where 
the adversely affected group is readily identifiable and relatively cohesive. A pollution tax with small 
distributional effects which are in any case difficult to detect and widely diffused may not generate strong 
political resistance. Political considerations aside, on normative grounds governments may wish to offset 
the regressive incidence on low-income groups of a pollution tax (e.g., the carbon tax mentioned 
above) through some form of compensation. Two possible forms of direct compensation would be (i) 
an equivalent reduction in the regressive incidence of another tax (or combination of taxes), and (ii) a 
direct transfer payment to low-income households. 
Besides compensation, another means of addressing the distributional impact of a pollution tax would 
be to grant certain exemptions. This is more appropriate for industries which can demonstrate special 
hardship -- in the case of a carbon tax, for example, energy-intensive industries that compete in world 
markets. In the case of Sweden's carbon tax, the government chose to put a cap on tax payments to 
ease the burden on certain industries (OECD 1994c). Several objections have been raised to such 
exemptions however: (i) they constitute an effective subsidy of energy- and hence pollution-intensive 
industries; (ii) for a given national emissions target, a subsidy on certain sectors would require a higher 
tax on others; (iii) the measure could evolve into a more-or-less permanent form of protection for the 
exempted sectors (Pearson and Smith 1991).
 Very often, governments devising charge schemes must be prepared to 
sacrifice technical elegance in the interests of ease of implementation. Take the example of solid waste. 
All but three OECD countries have instituted waste collection charges for municipal solid waste. 
Generally the charge for households is levied on a flat rate while industry is often charged by quantity as 
well. On environmental and economic grounds, a charge should also take into account type/
characteristics of the waste, but such differentiation would be exceedingly costly to apply at the level of 
the individual waste generator. Some countries grant rebates for waste properly disposed of by the 
generator. In Denmark, this rebate scheme has at times caused debate about what constitutes waste, 
suggesting the need for clearly defined eligibility criteria.
The virtue of simplicity.
The United Kingdom (UK) government has recently advanced a proposal to levy a tax on all landfilled 
waste (see , 17 May 1995, p.8). The environmental objective is to promote 
incineration, recycling and waste minimisation; the fiscal objective is to maintain revenue neutrality by 
lowering social insurance taxes by an equivalent amount. Within a decade the target is a 10-per cent 
reduction in the proportion of waste which is dumped in landfills (currently around 70 per cent); a 
further 10-per cent reduction is targeted for the second decade of the tax. While some have argued that 
a general waste tax would be more effective in minimising waste, the advantage of the landfill tax is the 
ease of administration, since it can be collected at a small number of well-identified sites. Questions have 
also been raised about the assumed environmental superiority of incineration over landfilling and fears 
have been voiced by local authorities over a possible increase in illegal dumping. Objections have also 
been raised to the choice of tax base: the tax is to be calculated as a percentage of the waste disposal 
charge rather than on the basis of weight. Such an  tax, it is argued, would penalise most 
the users of the better-engineered (hence more expensive) landfills, diverting waste to cheaper sites with
fewer environmental safeguards (e.g., to stop leaching or trap gas). A weight-based tax would make 
sense, however, only if the environmental damage caused by the waste were a function of weight alone, 
which it clearly is not. Administratively, the   charge is simpler to implement since records on 
disposal costs already exist; to charge on weight would require the installation of scales (or 




 Experience suggests that charges are more likely to gain political acceptance if  Gradual escalation.
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to adjust to the charge. Alternatively, if the government decides to initiate the tax at a high rate, then 
pre-announcement of the measure should enable existing polluters time to adjust their production 
processes or take other measures to reduce their future tax liabilities. Also, to avoid sudden large 
changes in tax rates that reduce the predictability of the investment climate, the government may wish to 
start with low charges and then gradually raise them towards the "optimal" level (i.e., the one where the 
environmental goal is reached). Finally, polluters may be reluctant to accept higher charges until they are 
convinced that the charge revenues are being put to effective use to raise environmental quality. 
 The acceptability of a pollution charge 
may depend on the public perception that the revenues are being reinvested in environmental 
improvement or, alternatively, that the charge is not being levied simply for general revenue-raising
purposes. For instance, in Denmark, the allocation of revenue from a charge on milk cartons to the 
general budget was opposed when it appeared that the charge did not have the desired incentive effect. 
Earmarking -- or deciding in advance that some or all of the revenue from an eco-tax will be used for 
certain environmental purposes -- may increase the tax's political acceptability. If a pollution tax is set at 
a high enough level to achieve the environmental quality goal, then earmarking revenues for pollution
reduction measures would not be justified. In practice, however, governments seldom set pollution 
taxes high enough to have the desired incentive effects on their own, in which case earmarking can aid 
in achieving the desired environmental outcome.
Transparency in revenue use: a limited role for earmarking.
The strength of earmarking is also its weakness. By setting aside some amount of revenue in a separate 
fund for a specific use, it thereby insulates those resources from competition among alternative uses. 
Where environmental investments have traditionally been underfinanced because of their low estimated 
rates of return (based on standard cost-benefit analysis), such earmarking may be a useful interim 
measure. The risk is that the earmarked revenue would continue to be spent on environmental projects 
even though rates of return based on an extended cost-benefit analysis (i.e., factoring in environmental 
costs and benefits) would not justify the investments. Also, earmarking of revenues for environment 
might set a precedent for other types of expenditures.
A special case of earmarking is the levying of user charges for certain environmental services. In this 
case, the charge collected is considered payment for a service rendered, and the revenue is used to 
cover the costs of provision. If the revenue collected exceeds the amount necessary to provide an 
adequate level of service, then the issue arises once more of whether that additional revenue should be 
earmarked. The water quality management programmes in three European countries -- France, 
Germany and the Netherlands -- employ systems of effluent charges where the charge revenues are 
used to finance investments in waste water treatment and other water quality improvements. In the case 
of the Netherlands, the charge rate has risen steeply over time. As a result, the charge has gone from
being principally a cost-recovery device for water treatment to being an incentive device to lower 
discharges. At the same time, since the revenue is earmarked, and pollution loads have fallen with some 
lag, the result has been overinvestment in treatment capacity: it is estimated that public treatment plants 
have surplus capacity of about 20 per cent (OECD 1996).
Product taxes and tax-subsidy schemes
Product taxes are indirect instruments levied on products associated with pollution rather than on 
pollutants per se. This makes them easier to administer, since no metering of actual discharges is 
required. Moreover, governments usually have an administrative system already in place for the 
collection of excise taxes, so the institutional demands of a product tax are modest. Also, with an excise 
tax, there is greater scope for choice than with an effluent/emission tax of where to levy the tax. By 
definition, the latter should be levied at source. With an excise tax, however, it is possible to levy it at 
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on where it is levied -- may be very different from its effective incidence -- which depends on relevant 
supply, demand and substitution elasticities. What matters in choosing where to levy the tax is how easy 
it is to collect. In general, the fewer the taxpayers the easier collection should be. Thus, with the US tax 
on chlorofluorcarboms (CFCs), it was decided to levy the tax on CFC producers and importers, who 
are far fewer in number than CFC users (Barthold 1994).
The most common sorts of environmentally-motivated product taxes/charges in OECD countries apply 
to fertiliser, lubricant oil, CFCs, and product packaging (OECD 1994). Other products sometimes 
subject to an environmental tax are batteries, tires, disposable razors and disposable cameras. Product
taxes can be combined with subsidies or rebates. Alternatively, revenues from an environmental excise 
tax can be placed in an earmarked fund to finance clean-up. Germany has long had a tax-subsidy 
scheme for oil products. A tax on lubrication oil is used to finance a subsidy paid to firms which accept 
and dispose of waste oil properly, with the subsidy based on the average cost of disposal. Judging from 
the high percentage of waste oil that is properly disposed of, the scheme appears to have worked 
effectively. Besides its CFC tax, since 1980 the United States has levied an excise tax on hazardous 
chemicals to fund the Environmental Protection Agency's hazardous waste site clean-up programme 
(known as Superfund). Also, since the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, it has levied an additional excise tax
on petroleum and petroleum products to fund the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Barthold 1994).
For the most part, environmental excise taxes have been employed either as user fees (e.g., to cover the 
costs of treatment and disposal after use), as recycling incentives, or as insurance premia in a mandated 
risk pooling scheme like the oil spill fund. Much less frequently are they employed as Pigovian taxes 
designed to internalise the costs of environmental damage in prices. For that, the amount of the tax 
would need to be linked to some estimate of the environmental damage caused by the product's use or 
improper disposal. A few examples do exist: in the United States, the amount of the CFC tax is a 
function of the particular product's ozone-depletion potential (a rough measure of the degree of 
environmental damage it causes); in Sweden, a tax on diesel fuel is differentiated by environmental 
characteristics (sulphur, aromatics, etc.), with a rebate given on "environmental diesel" (OECD 1994b).
Deposit-refund schemes
Deposit-refund schemes may be instituted voluntarily by industry or mandated by government, though 
most are now mandatory. While deposit-refund could potentially be applied to a number of products to 
encourage recovery/recycling, they are still mainly applied to glass, plastic and metal beverage 
containers. One important consideration in deposit-refund schemes is the share of the deposit fee in the 
total product cost. Experience suggests that for beverages (e.g., beer and soft drinks) where packaging 
costs are a relatively high share of total price, return rates tend to be high; for wine and liquor, the 
deposit rate is relatively low in relation to product cost and return rates are correspondingly low. 
Another consideration is the relevant substitution options for the product(s) covered by the deposit-
refund scheme. For instance, a deposit fee on new returnable bottles may encourage use of recycled 
bottles, but it may also divert supply to one-way containers made of materials not subject to any charge 
or deposit-refund scheme. In such case, it would be advisable to combine the deposit fee with a product 
charge on one-way packaging containers.
Still another issue in implementing a deposit-refund scheme is compensation to retailers for the handling 
costs of returned packaging. Those costs can be substantial, and a system not ensuring handling cost 
recovery is not likely to generate strong support from retailers. Where a separate collection network 
needs to be organised for the recovery of recyclable materials, the extent of coverage (and thus the 
convenience of use) of the network is an important factor conditioning recovery rates, and the costs of 
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establishing and maintaining the network need to be considered when setting charge rates.
Tradable permits
Permit trading schemes are quantity-based instruments, which limit overall levels of pollutants in a 
defined pollution-control area. Thus, their environmental outcome is more certain than for price-based
instruments like charges and taxes. Public opposition to such schemes may also be greater, however, if 
they are perceived by environmental groups and/or the public at large as giving industry a license to 
pollute. Thus, in the case of the United States, which has pioneered use of this type of instrument, 
reference is made to emission credits rather than pollution permits and an attempt is made to de-
emphasise the explicit nature of the property right (Hahn 1989). Industry support, on the other hand, 
could be greater for a permit trading scheme than a pollution charge, if for example the government 
chooses to allocate a portion of permits to existing firms free of charge or for a nominal fee. In this way, 
some of those firms could stand to profit from subsequent permit trades, depending on how effectively
they can reduce their own emissions. Thus, "grandfathering" of at least a portion of the property rights 
(or permits) has been a standard feature of permit trading schemes in the United States (including those 
for SO and NO  emissions under the 1990 Clean Air Act). 2x
The US SO  emission trading programme has been underway for three years, long enough to make a 
preliminary evaluation of its effectiveness. While the bulk of SO  permits are allocated to power 
companies, a small number are auctioned once a year by the Chicago Board of Trade to set a price for 
them. According to one such evaluation (see 6 May 1996, p.15), the programme has 
far exceeded expectations in achieving rapid emissions reductions. In 1995, the 110 most polluting 
power plants emitted only 5.3 million tonnes of SO , well below the government ceiling of 8.7 million 
tonnes. Arguably, in terms of environmental effectiveness, such a quantity-based system is far superior 
to a tax on energy consumers. The ultimate objective is to cut emissions to half their 1980 level by 
2010. By one USEPA estimate, the cost to industry so far of the emission reductions has been US$2.5 
billion, or roughly half what it would have cost under a traditional regulatory programme. One indication 
of the effectiveness of the programme is that the price of a permit has been plummeting, from US$132 
per tonne in early 1995 to US$68 in early 1996; when trading was launched in 1993, the expected 





Permit trading schemes should incorporate clearly defined, time-specific emission ceilings, so that 
polluters are not left in doubt about which emission reductions qualify for emission credits and which do 
not. Monitoring, record-keeping and reporting are key elements of a permit trading scheme, and a 
reliable database on initial emissions is needed to get the scheme started.
Developing Country Experience with Applying EIs
There may be factors specific to developing countries which give rise to policy implementation 
problems not commonly encountered in OECD countries. A shortage of skilled personnel is 
perhaps the most common handicap facing developing countries. While this is a general problem, 
it could have more serious implications for a policy built around CAC measures (where 
government officials should have detailed technical knowledge of the industries to be regulated) 
than for one relying on EIs (though the importance of detailed technical knowledge to designing 
effective EIs should not be underestimated). On the other hand, it is possible that other factors 
enhance the potential for applying EIs in developing countries. For example, it has been observed
that EIs are more likely to be accepted where there are not entrenched bureaucracies committed 
to defending the prerogatives they have come to enjoy under a CAC system. This advantage 
would clearly apply only if the developing country is just beginning to establish an environmental 
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management system. Also, it may be that pollution charges that affect industries differentially and 
thus induce structural adjustments can be accommodated more readily in a dynamic economic 
environment already characterised by rapid structural transformation. This section reviews 
several examples of EI applications in developing countries, wherever possible elaborating on 
implementation experience and problems. Similarities and differences with the experience in 






As yet, there has been no survey of the use of EIs in developing countries comparable to those done for 
OECD countries (see OECD 1989 and 1994b). Nevertheless, based on a review of the literature on 
environmental policy in the newly industrialising economies (NIEs) of Asia and Latin America (cf. 
OECD 1994a), a few observations can be made. While some countries have used EIs in certain 
applications since at least the mid-1970s, as in OECD countries the interest among NIEs in applying 
EIs more broadly has been growing in recent years. Thus far, the most frequent applications have been 
similar to those in OECD countries -- i.e., emission charges seem to predominate, with product charges 
also fairly common. Frequently, the emission charges in the NIEs take the form of non-compliance fees 
rather than straight charges on all emissions. Deposit-refund schemes are beginning to operate in the 
higher income NIEs, while in very few instances are tradable permit schemes operational (Singapore 
being the outstanding example of this approach thus far). As in OECD countries, the basic policy 
framework in all these countries is a regulatory one and EIs are generally designed as complements to 
regulation. Also, some NIEs have been experimenting with the use of voluntary agreements and other 
suasive instruments, which are also attracting wider interest in OECD countries (though a few countries
like Japan and the Netherlands have relied on them for quite some time).
Emission/effluent charges
Since the early 1980s, Korea has had an emission charge system (applicable to both air and water) 
which operates as a non-compliance fee, thus combining elements of CAC and EIs. Since 1983, the 
Environment Administration (now the Ministry of Environment) has had the authority to impose an 
emission charge on facilities exceeding mandated emission standards. Initially, the charge could be levied 
only if the polluter should continue to violate standards after having been issued an improvement order, 
but since 1986 the levy is automatic once emissions exceed the permitted level (Chung and Lee 1992). 
Since the charge was introduced by an administrative act, it could be implemented with a minimum of 
delay. The charge is based only on pollutant concentrations. It varies with the location of the facility, the 
duration of excess discharges and the number of previous violations. The charge rate has historically 
been set rather low, in some instances falling below the operating costs of a pollution treatment facility 
(Chung, 1991), with the result that polluters have been known not to operate their treatment plants at 
the risk of detection. A familiar problem with non-compliance fees is that, while if set at proper levels 
they discourage violation of standards, they do not reward overattainment. Moreover, the use of 
concentration alone as the basis for the fee can encourage dilution without any reduction in total pollution 
load. Thus, there has been discussion in Korea about the merits of shifting to a straight emission charge 
that would tax all emissions, not just those above standard, and would combine concentration with 
quantity in the charge formula (Rhee 1994).
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incorporated features of an effluent charge in that the licensing fee could be varied according to the 
quantity of waste discharged. With the rapid expansion of palm-oil production during the 1970s, this 
industry soon developed into the largest source of water pollution in the country (see Vincent 1993). 
The system was built on effluent standards which were phased in over four years, starting from 5000 
parts per million (ppm) -- which is one-fifth the level in untreated palm-oil effluent -- and declining to 
500 ppm. The gradual phase-in was designed to give industry time to construct treatment facilities and 
acquire experience in operating them. In practice, the licensing fee consisted of two parts: a flat 
administrative fee and a variable effluent-related fee. For releases into a watercourse, the fee was set at 
M$10/tonne of BOD load discharged. The government continued to wield the threat of revoking a 
mill's operating license if it did not comply with the standard, though this was not done in the first year in 
order to allow firms a grace period for adjustment to the new policy. In effect, a firm had the option of 
paying an excess license fee of M$100/tonne for discharges above the 5000 ppm standard. Also, the 
government reserved the right to grant a partial or full waiver of the effluent-related portion of the fee to 
those mills conducting research on new treatment methods. Beginning in the second year, the standard 
became not only more stringent but mandatory, with the threat of license cancellation now operative. In 
the first two years of the programme, the pollution load from palm-oil mills fell from 15.9 to 2.6 million 
population- equivalents and by 1989 the population-equivalent was less than one per cent of its level at 
the inception of the programme, despite the fact that palm-oil production was at a record high. The 
CAC aspect of the programme became dominant over time, partly because the fixed effluent-related 
license fee was gradually eroded in real terms by inflation. When tested, the government threat to close 
down delinquent mills proved credible. The costs to industry of the programme were not negligible, with 
cumulative expenditures on building and operating treatment systems having reached M$100 million by 
1984. The costs, however, were mostly shifted onto palm-oil growers, since they could not be passed 
on to consumers in a highly competitive world market whereas individual mills exerted considerable 
market power over neighbouring growers.
An effluent charge system for total suspended solids (TSS) from the coal processing industries of Bihar, 
India, is proposed in Kumar and Sherif (1995). The authors note that the present effluent standard (100 
mg/litre) is widely violated because of firms' high abatement costs and government's weak monitoring 
and enforcement capability. While detailed firm-level cost data are not available, the authors estimate 
marginal abatement cost functions based on information regarding each firm's volume of effluent 
discharge, initial pollution load and size of particles. Those firms with an initially low pollution load, other 
things equal, have relatively high marginal costs of further reducing the load. Also, those firms whose
effluent has large average particle size have higher marginal abatement costs, since they must undertake 
an additional processing step (flocculation). The total abatement costs of universal compliance with the 
uniform effluent standard are compared with those of two alternatives: (i) a uniform effluent charge 
levied on effluent concentration in waste water such that total abatement is the same as that associated 
with the enforcement of a common standard; (ii) a two-tiered effluent charge, with a higher rate on those
firms whose waste water has TSS concentrations above 150 mg/litre and a nominal charge on the rest. 
Both (i) and (ii) yield significant abatement cost savings relative to the strict regulatory approach, while 
(i) generates somewhat larger revenues for government. The authors note that, by ploughing the charge 
revenues back into upgrading monitoring and enforcement, the government can deal with a central 
practical weakness of the CAC approach, viz., the limited institutional capacity at local level to 
implement the policy effectively.
China has had a system of pollution charges, most assessed as non-compliance fees, for the last fifteen 
years (Potier 1995; NEPA, 1992). The charge is levied on both the quantity and the concentration of 
discharges. The system has been introduced in three phases, beginning in 1979 on an experimental 
basis in Suzhou city and then gradually extended to 27 provinces, autonomous regions and cities directly 
under the central government. In 1982 it was extended nation-wide. The system is backstopped by a 
fourfold system of penalties for serious violations of standards. In principle, the charges are to be set at a 
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facilities, to encourage broad compliance with standards. The charges are assessed on air and waste 
water discharges as well as on noise, solid waste and radioactive wastes; they cover a range of 
parameters, with higher charges levied on more toxic pollutants (NEPA, 1992, p.11).
During the third phase, which began in 1988 and continues to the present, the emphasis has been on 
reforming the system for allocation and use of charge revenues. Until that year, revenues were largely 
allocated as grants to subsidise pollution control measures, but since then there has been a shift towards 
greater reliance on loans. The revenues are deposited in an earmarked local environmental fund 
managed by a designated bank. Roughly 80 per cent of those revenues are then lent or given to 
enterprises for pollution control investments, with the remainder going to environmental agencies to 
finance the capital and operating costs of the charge programme -- e.g., the purchase of monitoring 
equipment and analytical instruments, the hiring and training of additional staff. Charge revenues have 
been a major source of financing for pollution control investments: from 1982 to 1986, they accounted 
for almost 30 per cent of pollution control expenditures in the steel industry; during that period the 
industry's rate of compliance with discharge standards rose from one-third to 60 per cent. 
Since charges are relatively low and have been eroded in real terms by inflation, they provide relatively 
weak incentives on their own to reduce pollution. Also, at the local level, environmental officials are 
amenable to influence by industrialists intent on avoiding the charge. Perhaps one of the greatest 
weaknesses of the scheme is that state enterprises are permitted to pass on the charge costs in higher 
prices or entitled to a tax rebate to offset the charge. 
Among the improvements being considered is a gradual increase in the charge rate, which is strongly 
opposed by industry. Also, the practice of extending loans from the environment funds only to those 
enterprises that have paid charges is to be phased out.
In a local experiment begun in 1992, the city of Chongqing in Sichuan province introduced an SO  tax 
which, because of the difficulty of measuring actual emissions, was levied on the amount and sulphur 
content of the coal burned by each industrial enterprise. At the same time, another city, Yichang, in 
Hubei province, introduced a system of SO discharge permits, with charges levied on emissions 
exceeding the permitted level. In the initial phase, there was gross underreporting of emissions by 
factories, estimated through plant checks and tallies of water and coal consumption at three-fourths of 
total emissions. Consequently, the charge rate was substantially increased; whether or not as a direct 
result, atmospheric SO  concentrations have fallen significantly. Assuming the problem of monitoring 






Thailand has been studying the feasibility of introducing a waste water and sewage charge for the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA) (see Phantumvanit  1994). The charge would differentiate 
between households and small industries on the one hand and large industries on the other, with the
former paying a surcharge on their water bills based on metered water consumption and the latter being 
charged according to a formula that includes both the flow volume and the concentration of BOD 
discharges in waste water. The charge on BOD is structured as a non-compliance fee, levied only on
discharges exceeding standards. Limiting the pollution-linked charge only to large polluters (defined as 
those discharging on average 5 kg. or more of BOD per day) reduces the monitoring burden while 
adding the waste water charge onto households' water bills simplifies collection and administration.
Nevertheless, there are certain problems which can be anticipated. First, the general public is not 
accustomed to the notion of paying a waste water (or sewage) treatment fee. Assuming that the 
additional charge does not pose a sizeable financial burden to the average urban household, the general
et al.
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poor households' water consumption represents a disproportionate share of their income. This could be 
the case even if their average consumption is roughly equal to that of rich households; in practice, it 
might even be higher since water consumption is closely correlated with family size, and average poor 
household size exceeds that of wealthy ones. Another, perhaps even greater problem for implementation
is how heavily polluting industries might react. If the fee adds significantly to their costs (as it might for 
some textile firms, for example), they could be expected to oppose it vigorously. If, on the other hand, 
the fee is set so low as to have no noticeable effect on their operations, its incentive value would be nil, 
though it could still be useful as a cost recovery device for common waste water treatment. The 
proposed charge scheme in Thailand is analogous, then, to the user charges applied in France and
Germany in the sense that its principal function would be to recoup the operating (and part of the 
investment) costs of municipal waste water treatment facilities.
Product taxes and tax differentiation
An emission charge system can be costly to administer, especially if it relies on monitoring actual 
emissions rather than on standard industry emission factors (or coefficients). Moreover, in the case of air
pollution, a system of emission charges based on actual emissions monitoring is still not practical for 
mobile sources. In principle, such a system could be designed (see Eskeland 1994), using a 
presumptive charge based on a standard emission factor for each model and year (e.g., grammes 
emitted per litre or per kilometre) and multiplied by the distance travelled since the previous mileage 
reading. A partial rebate could be made if the periodic vehicle test reveals actual emissions well below 
the emission factor. However, the heavy administrative and technical requirements of such a system 
would make it extremely costly if not impossible to implement. Thus, Eskeland proposes a combination 
of a regulatory instrument (an abatement requirement) and an indirect EI (a product tax on gasoline) to 
mimic the effects of an emissions charge. An emission charge achieves two results simultaneously: 
discouraging the polluting activity and providing incentives to make that activity cleaner. Mandated 
abatement requirements achieve the second objective, while the gasoline tax accomplishes the first. One 
problem is that the demand for automobile use appears in many countries to be rather inelastic with 
respect to the price of gasoline, so the tax might have to be quite high to have a noticeable effect on 
kilometres travelled.
Another approach to addressing air pollution from mobile sources -- one applied widely in OECD 
countries but also in Taiwan and Thailand -- is tax differentiation between leaded and unleaded gasoline.
Soon after the release of a study (USAID 1990) which estimated that by the age of seven Bangkok 
children collectively suffer a loss of up to 700,000 IQ points as a result of elevated blood lead levels, 
the Thai government took steps to encourage substitution away from leaded gasoline in motor vehicles. 
Beginning in May 1991, the government introduced unleaded gasoline at a slight discount relative to 
leaded gasoline, subsidising the former from a surtax on the latter. It also introduced a regulation 
requiring that all cars sold in Thailand from September 1993 be equipped with a catalytic converter. As 
a result of the tax differentiation and regulation, the market share of unleaded gasoline has risen steeply 
in recent years (to roughly half the market). In Taiwan, a similar price differentiation strategy has been 
used with similar results. Taiwan has not, however, required mandatory installation of catalytic 
converters but relies instead on a requirement that all new vehicles use unleaded gasoline and comply 
with new emission standards (O'Connor 1994). Monitoring reports by the Taiwanese EPA indicate that 
the average lead content in ambient air in Taipei decreased from 0.46 g/m in 1989 to 0.18 g/m in 1992 
(Pan 1994).
A differential tax on leaded gasoline needs to be reviewed regularly since, as demand for and 
production of unleaded gasoline increases, at some point the relative price of the two should reverse, 
weakening the rationale for the tax differentiation.
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A number of developing countries and economies in transition have established environmental funds to 
finance certain environmental expenditures. The pros and cons of earmarked funds were discussed 
above for OECD countries, and the same considerations apply for other countries. Such funds are best
viewed as transitional mechanisms to mobilise financing to address an accumulated backlog of 
environmental problems. They can also play a useful role where capital for environmental investments 
cannot be raised through established financial institutions.
There are several possible ways of financing such funds: a contribution from the general government 
budget; a donor contribution; revenue from pollution charges; or some combination. In the event that 
charge revenue is used and that such charges are levied as non-compliance fees, this can provide the 
wrong incentives. In effect, if those responsible for fee collection are the same as those responsible for 
fund management, they would have an incentive to encourage continued non-compliance. Otherwise, 
their source of funds would dry up. This incentive problem is at least partially addressed in the Korean 
scheme. The Korean environmental fund, established in 1983; is financed one-third from a non-
compliance fee with the remainder coming from a government budgetary allocation and from interest 
income. The devolution of fund management to a semi-governmental body, the Environmental 
Management Corporation (EMC), separates responsibility for fee collection from that for fund 
management. Thailand also established an environment fund, in 1991, with the entire initial capital of 
US$200 million contributed by the government (largely through a transfer from the oil price stabilisation
fund). Subsequently, a foreign donor made an additional contribution. In both the Korean and Thai 
cases, the funds are used primarily as a source of cheap credit for firms investing in pollution control 
technologies and for operators of public environmental facilities like sewage treatment plants. The Thai 
fund, however, is under-utilised, apparently because of the rather strict and time-consuming procedures 
for loan application.
Deposit-refund schemes
These have been implemented in a few higher income developing countries, notably Korea and Taiwan. 
In Korea, the Ministry of Environment proposed an ambitious deposit-refund programme, covering a 
wide range of products -- food and beverage containers, pesticide containers, batteries, tires, lubricant 
oil, plastics, and certain domestic appliances (e.g., televisions and washing machines). In the end, the list 
was considerably shortened following objections from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and deposit
rates on those items covered are generally very low. For example, the deposit rate on PET bottles 
ranges from 3 to 7 won (roughly 0.5 to 1 US cent), depending on volume. Rhee (1994) argues that a 
reason for the low deposit rates (as well as low emission charge rates) is the government's concern to 
keep inflation low. The strong influence of industrial interests on government policy seems as likely an 
explanation. The result is that there is little incentive for waste recovery, and refunds claimed represent 
only a tiny fraction of deposits collected.
In Taiwan, the deposit-refund scheme has been more effective in practice. Since 1988, Taiwan has 
been implementing a recovery/recycling system for several types of solid waste, including PET 
(polyethylene terephthalate) bottles, glass bottles, aluminium cans, waste paper, used tires, lubricant oils, 
mercury cell batteries, and pesticide containers. A deposit-refund scheme to support the recycling effort 
is to be introduced in a step-wise fashion, beginning with PET bottles. There are some 104 
manufacturers of PET bottles in Taiwan making some 260 million bottles a year. Each is required to 
submit a recycling and disposal plan to the provincial or municipal authorities. Members of the industry 
have formed a foundation which administers a joint recycling fund to cover costs of collection and 
recycling of the bottles, with the fund replenished from a levy on the sale of each bottle (Chien, 1991). 
The deposit rate per PET bottle has been set at NT$2.00 (around US$0.08), with a portion of this 
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companies that recover the bottles from some 14,000 collection locations. The Taiwanese
Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) set a target recycling rate of 50 percent for the first two 
years (1989-90) and 60 percent by the fourth year. As of the third year, the accomplished recycling 
rate had only reached 41 percent, but by the fourth year (1992) it jumped to almost 80 per cent (Pan 
1994), comparing favourably with rates in OECD countries.
In short, the deposit rate in Taiwan appears to have been set at a level yielding strong incentives for 
recycling. The wide distribution of collection points and the development of a sizeable salvaging industry 
have also contributed to the scheme's success. The focus initially on one product presumably made the 
system more manageable and may have provided valuable lessons when the government begins to 
extend it to other products.
Tradable permits
To date, there has been little experimentation with tradable permits in developing countries. Permit 
trading schemes depend on the creation and enforcement of new sorts of property right. Where more 
familiar types of property right are only vaguely defined and/or weakly enforced, it may be premature to 
think of introducing new ones. On the other hand, the growing experience with permit trading in the 
USA has begun to stimulate interest in developing countries.
Among non-OECD countries, Singapore has been a pioneer in this approach to environmental policy, 
using competitive tenders for permits to import and use ozone-depleting substances (specifically, CFCs 
regulated under the Montreal Protocol) and for permits to own an automobile. In the case of CFCs, 
each quarter the national consumption quota (as defined under the MP) is allocated among importers 
and users, half on the basis of historic consumption ("grandfathering") and half through a sealed-bid 
tender. Importers and users must register to participate in the bidding process, in which each firm 
specifies the volume of CFCs it would like to purchase and its offer price. Bids are then ranked by 
price and the lowest winning bid price (i.e., the one which clears the market) serves as the quota price 
for the full allotment of CFCs, including the pro-rated half. There was a steep increase in quota prices 
during the first few rounds of bidding (caused in part by stockpiling). With the price hike, firms faced a 
strong incentive to adopt conservation measures and substitute technologies, which has resulted in a 
swift and sizeable reduction in CFC demand. The auction procedure has enabled the government to 
appropriate a sizeable share of the quota rents, which it has used to subsidise recycling services and the 
diffusion of information on alternative technologies (O'Connor 1991). Since the decline in demand 
depressed the quota price, the government accelerated the phase-out schedule in an effort to support 
the quota price and maintain the incentive to continued demand reductions.
Singapore has also devised a vehicle quota system designed to increase the price of ownership of a 
motor vehicle. When the price of an ownership permit is added to other price-augmenting measures -- 
an import duty, registration fee, additional registration fee, and annual road tax based on engine 
capacity, the final price of owning a car in Singapore is 4.5 to 5 times the landed vehicle cost. The 
Vehicle Quota System (VQS) was introduced in May 1990, following essentially the same principle as 
the CFC quota system. Under VQS, anyone wishing to own a vehicle (except for buses and 
emergency vehicles) must have a certificate of entitlement (COE). Those vehicles already registered at 
the inception of the system were assumed to have a COE (i.e., grandfathered in), while anyone wanting 
to buy a new one is required to bid for a COE in monthly tender exercises. Each bidder must indicate 
the amount he or she is willing to pay for the right to own a vehicle. Bids are ranked from highest to 
lowest; each successful bidder pays a quota premium equal to the lowest successful bid price. The COE 
is valid for ten years from the date of registration of the vehicle, after which the COE must be renewed
at the prevailing price which is set as the 12-month moving average price of the COE in that vehicle 
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(roughly US$12,000) and for a Honda Civic LS the COE price represented one-quarter of the total
sale price (Fan, Menon, and Olszewski, 1992).
The effective functioning of the CFC quota auction depends on a sufficiently large number of bidders to 
provide adequate insurance against collusive bidding. Another condition that is clearly met is that the 
benefits from reducing consumption are independent of who makes the reductions (i.e., a unit of 
emissions causes the same amount of damage wherever it occurs). It is doubtful whether the vehicle 
ownership entitlement scheme would work as well in most other countries as in Singapore, since few 
other countries have the same geographic concentration of motor vehicle use. In Thailand, for example, 
a vehicle sold to a Bangkok driver has a very different effect on congestion and pollution from one sold 
to a driver in rural Nakon Ratchasima or in Khon Kaen. 
Suasive instruments: voluntary agreements and community "right to know"
If the concern of policy makers is with speedy implementation of control measures at minimum 
administrative cost, then certain suasive instruments (SIs) should be considered, notably voluntary 
pollution control agreements. There is a long history of the use of such agreements as an instrument of 
local environmental policy in Japan (see Haga and Yano 1992 and O'Connor 1994). Among developing 
countries, Indonesia has one of the richest experiences with this approach.
In Indonesia, pollution reduction agreements are part of a tightly focused programme, known as 
PROKASIH (or Clean River Programme), begun in mid-1989 to clean up the most heavily polluted 
rivers (Woods , 1992). Major pollution sources along the 20 dirtiest rivers were originally 
targeted, but presently some 34 rivers are covered by the programme. Letters of agreement between 
provincial governors and directors of those companies have been drawn up and signed. While 
participation in the programme is not voluntary, the letters of agreement are not legally binding. Though 
the terms vary, in general enterprises commit themselves to cutting effluent concentrations and loadings 
in half within an agreed timeframe. As of 1994, 1,405 establishments were participating in PROKASIH.
Along 18 out of 34 rivers, participating plants have significantly reduced their pollution loads (in terms 
of BOD), while for 9 rivers average daily pollution load has increased since 1990-91 (Afsah, Laplante 
and Makarim, 1995). In provinces which have demonstrated the best results, agreements have been 
renegotiated upon expiry with more stringent conditions or, in the event the conditions were not met, 
governors have issued warnings to the industries concerned. The government has also used publicity 
regarding participants' performance to good effect. In 1991, following a public announcement by the 
Population and Environment Minister of individual firms' records of violation of their agreements, the 
government agency monitoring the programme (BAPEDAL) was inundated with inquiries from industry 
about regulations and standards. While the data clearly shows sharp BOD reductions in the initial years 
of the programme, more recent indications are that BOD loads have been rising again, raising doubts 
about the sustainability of such an approach in the face of strong growth pressures.
et al.
Another form of suasive instrument (build on a CAC foundation) is the assignment to the public of the 
legal right to know about the pollution generated by industrial enterprises. Such community right-to-
know legislation exists in the United States. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act of 1986 requires that certain types of manufacturing facilities report their annual toxic chemical 
releases and transfers to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which in turn makes a toxic 
release inventory (TRI) available to the public. The high visibility this system gives to the pollution 
streams of specific firms has increased managers' incentives to improve environmental performance. In 
consequence, 1,000 firms signed on to a programme administered by EPA's Office of Pollution 
Prevention and Toxics under which they committed themselves to a 50-per cent reduction in emissions 
of 17 high-priority chemicals by 1995. The legislation has also been a factor in encouraging some 
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Manufacturers Association launched a Responsible Care Programme in 1989, using toxic release data 
to track performance of its member companies and to assist in the identification of best practice cases 
which can set an example for other members.
While the author is not aware of be any comparable legislation on the books of developing countries, 
Martin (1992) argues that the approach may be suitable for developing countries, where resources are 
limited for intensive monitoring and enforcement by a centralised agency. US experience suggests,
however, that complying with the law is by no means costless: the EPA estimates that US companies 
spend US$346 million a year just to monitor and report their releases, before any investments are made 
in pollution control. The EPA must also administer the law and somehow ensure minimal accuracy of
reporting.
A system of strictly voluntary agreements may be less costly than right-to-know legislation, but it is also 
likely to be less consistently effective. For, while both rely to some degree on publicity (whether positive 
or adverse) as an enforcement device, with voluntary agreements the public revelation of participants' 
pollution records is somewhat serendipitous, while with "right-to-know" legislation disclosure of the 
record is assured. Indonesia's PROKASIH falls somewhere in between, in that participation in the 
programme is not voluntary, and there is a regular system of monitoring of environmental performance of 
participants. The next step would be to incorporate a provision for regular public disclosure, so that 
participating companies know their environmental performance will become public record.
3. A Framework for Analysing Implementation Problems 
Normally, in assessing alternative environmental policy instruments five criteria need to be weighed: 
environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, equity, administrative feasibility, and political
acceptability. These are not always easily separable, however. For example, administrative complexity 
raises the economic costs of implementing a policy. Likewise, if the compliance costs are very large, or 
if the distribution of those costs is seen to be inequitable, the policy may face strong political resistance. 
Most often, problems of policy implementation arise because of inadequate regard for either 
administrative feasibility or political acceptability, or both. Another possible cause of such problems is 
the mismatch between the type of instrument chosen and the nature of the problem targeted. Still others 
are weaknesses in the legal and institutional framework.
3.1. Political considerations
 
Policy makers have their own interests which need to be factored into an analysis of the political 
process, as do the members of the bureaucracy ultimately responsible for policy implementation 
(Hahn 1989). Other relevant interest groups include polluting industries and/or consumers, 






Until recently at least, political support for EIs has been lukewarm, including in most OECD countries, 
which goes a long way towards explaining their infrequent use. Politicians and administrators
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accustomed to having direct control over individual polluters may be reluctant to cede that for a system 
in which they simply set targets and let industry decide how to meet them. Somewhat less explicably, 
polluting industries have also tended to favour regulations over EIs. First, regulations generally have a 
greater   bias than EIs. For example, new pollution sources are frequently subjected to 
stricter standards than existing sources, a practice referred to as "grandfathering". Also, the choice of 
emission or effluent standard is often dependent on the existing abatement technologies or those 
expected to be available in the near future. The practice of "grandfathering" may also be employed with 
some EIs -- e.g., in the initial allocation of permits under a permit trading scheme -- as a way of 
validating the prior claims of incumbents, but it is less common with pollution charges. Another
consideration is that, unlike standards, pollution charges are perceived as imposing a "double burden" 
on a polluting industry since it must invest in abatement technology and still pay the charge on its 





A key advantage of EIs over CAC is the former's informational parsimony. This results from the 
fact that the use of economic instruments forces polluters to reveal their willingness to pay (WTP) 
for the right to pollute and thereby their marginal abatement costs (MAC). A uniformly applied 
regulation or standard does not depend on polluters' WTP or MAC. If, however, regulators
sought to design an efficient system of regulation in the sense that the standard would be varied 
across polluters in such a way as to equate their MACs, the task of acquiring all the necessary 






While informational economies are a decided advantage of EIs, some EIs are much more information-
intensive and technically complex to administer than others. A tradable emissions permit scheme, for 
instance, requires detailed monitoring of emissions and tracking of permit trades. In the United States, 
where this sort of scheme is most frequently used, the sulphur dioxide (SO2) permit trading scheme 
relies on an annual spring auction held at the Chicago Board of Trade (home to the commodities 
exchange) to reveal permit prices. While such exchanges may be less well established in many 
developing countries, organising an auction is not likely to pose as great a challenge as tracking the 
bilateral permit trades between individual enterprises and monitoring their actual emissions. By contrast, 
a product-based pollution charge could be relatively easily administered in many countries, assuming 
they have a good track record in the collection of excise taxes. The information revealed by pollution 
charges is not entirely costless, however, since a trial-and-error process whereby charge rates are 
repeatedly adjusted until the appropriate level of charge is reached introduces uncertainty which can 
adversely affect investment and other decisions of industrial enterprises or others subject to the charge.
Mismatch of instrument to the problem at hand
The instrument chosen needs to be well-tailored to the characteristics of the pollution problem at 
hand. Factors which need to be weighed include:
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1. the nature of the pollutant (whether acutely toxic, bioaccumulative, carcinogenic, etc.) and of 
the dose-response function (whether linear, exponential, subject to threshold effects, etc.); 
2. the "demographic" characteristics of pollution sources (a few large sources or many small 
sources; geographically concentrated or dispersed sources; stationary or mobile sources);
3. the "economic" characteristics of the polluters (whether operating in competitive or non-
competitive industries; whether facing hard or soft budget constraints; whether facing similar or 
widely differing abatement costs);
4. the availability of economical substitutes/alternatives to the polluting products or processes; the 
elasticity of demand for the products of polluting industries.
Point (i) bears on the expected environmental benefits from close monitoring and strict enforcement, 
while point (ii) bears on the technical feasibility and costs of such monitoring. For example, where small 
doses of a substance can prove highly toxic to plant and/or animal life, the benefits in terms of damage 
costs avoided may well justify very close monitoring and strict enforcement source-by-source. 
However, if the sources are numerous and widely dispersed, the costs of individual source monitoring 
may be extremely high. In this case, a policy objective would be to find an instrument that reduces the 
need for such monitoring without increasing significantly environmental risk.
Another example is that of mobile source air pollution. Technical standards applied at the point of 
production may be an environmentally effective control strategy, but that depends heavily on the rate of 
turnover of the motor vehicle stock or, assuming that rate is low, on a complementary programme of 
retrofitting older vehicles with new control technologies. In any case, it is almost certainly not the most 
cost-effective strategy. While emission charges could be a cost-effective measure (at least in terms of 
abatement costs), the complexities of implementation are daunting and render this approach impractical 
for the time being. On the other hand, a product charge on the major polluting input (gasoline) can be 
easily administered (since most governments already levy gasoline taxes) and the efficiency loss is
relatively small. The environmental effectiveness could be enhanced by some degree of differentiation 
between types of gasoline -- e.g., leaded versus unleaded -- and between gasoline and diesel fuel, 
according to pollution effects.
The effectiveness of an emission charge or a product tax as incentive devices depends critically on 
relevant elasticities. If, in the preceding example, the elasticity of demand for gasoline is low, then the 
government would need to set a very high excise tax in order to have a noticeable impact on 
consumption levels. This might well make such a tax politically unacceptable. With limited substitution 
possibilities elasticities may well be low in the short run; allowing time for development of substitutes and 
alternatives and behavioural changes, elasticities can rise quite significantly. Pearce (1990) reports 
short-term demand elasticities for gasoline in Mexico in the range of -0.1 to -0.2; in the long run, 
however, they rise to over -1.0.
Legal and institutional barriers
Aspects of the legal framework which need to be considered in designing environmental 
policies are:
the system of allocation and enforcement of property rights, and 
the system of negotiation, execution and enforcement of contracts.
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Property rights are important determinants of the degree of stewardship which individuals or 
communities are willing to exercise over the environment. Thus, open access resources -- whose 
exploitation is not governed by any clear and enforceable system of property rights -- are 
particularly susceptible to degradation. Property rights -- whether vested in individuals, 
communities or the state, whether defined by law or by custom -- are important preconditions for 
the enforcement of any environmental policy, whether based on CAC or on EIs. The 
introduction of controls or incentives designed to affect use of environmental resources rests on 
some definition, whether explicit or implicit, of property rights in those resources. Take, for 
example, the case of air pollution control measures. If the government introduces standards for 
nitrogen oxide or sulphur dioxide emissions, it is challenging   property rights in air 
quality. Whereas previously the dominant right had been that of the polluter to use the 
atmosphere as a waste sink, the regulation re-defines the dominant property right to be that of the
public to breathe clean air. The ability of the government to give this re-distribution of property 
rights practical force depends very much on the degree of political support it enjoys for 
controlling air pollution.
the effectiveness of public institutions and in particular of those institutions charged with 
management of the environment or, in the case of eco-taxes, with the collection of tax revenues;
the level of development of market institutions.
de facto
In this example, the property rights remain implicit and their reallocation can occur only through 
the political process. In other words, there is no market in such property rights. Certain 
economic instruments -- notably, tradable permits -- rest on a more explicit definition of property 
rights in environmental resources and their allocation through markets. Owners of pollution rights 
who do not want to exercise those rights can sell them to others who do. The total available 
supply of those rights is restricted, however, which is why they possess economic value.
A key difference between a tradable permit scheme and a CAC approach is that in the former 
the initial assignment of property rights becomes a separate decision variable, unlike in the 
regulatory case where the initial assignment of rights is dictated by the output and pollution levels 
of existing firms. In a tradable permit scheme the government can choose an allocation rule which 
does not simply validate the  . For example, by auctioning off the supply of pollution 
permits, it can ensure that they go to those with the greatest willingness to pay, extracting the 
economic rents in the process. Those incumbents unwilling to make a sufficiently high bid could 
lose out to newcomers or even to environmental groups interested in withdrawing permits from 
use. It is understandable, then, why existing enterprises might prefer a strict regulatory approach
to one involving permit trading or, in the event of trading, would prefer an initial permit allocation 
grandfathered according to historical output or capacity levels. 
status quo
Another factor which can impact on choice of instrument is the degree of public versus private 
ownership or control over productive assets. Where public-sector enterprises represent a 
sizeable presence in polluting industries, the potential for conflict of interest arises. Under a 
regulatory approach, it is desirable that an independent agency be vested with the necessary legal 
authority and enforcement powers over state enterprises; the ministry managing a particular 
enterprise cannot be considered an impartial enforcer since its primary objective is to meet 
production (or revenue) targets. In the case of EIs, applying pollution charges may be largely 
ineffectual if state-owned polluting enterprises can recoup any added costs from the government 
budget or financial institutions (Panayotou 1994). One interim solution could be to use a suasive 
instrument in the form of "environmental plan contracts" negotiated between the agency 
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managers of those enterprises. The contracts would specify measures to be adopted to reduce 
pollution, performance targets to be achieved, and penalties for non-attainment. Including 
environmental performance among the criteria used to calculate incentive pay for state enterprise 
managers and workers could reinforce such contracts. 
Institutional capabilities of the government to implement specific types of policies need to be 
considered. Trained personnel capable of designing and administering a programme of regulatory 
enforcement based on detailed technical and/or performance standards are not likely to be 
readily available in many developing countries. Government ministries and agencies with sizeable
influence and resources (notably the finance ministry and other economic ministries) are more 
likely than the environment agency/ministry to attract the small numbers of highly educated and 
qualified people. Even if a dedicated and competent core of personnel heads the environment 
agency, it is likely to have difficulties executing the agency's mandate without adequate laboratory
facilities and support personnel to carry out an effective monitoring programme. Moreover, low 
salaries of government enforcement agents can also contribute to weak or partial enforcement. 
This litany of institutional weaknesses in developing countries has been recited many times over.
Are EIs an answer to these weaknesses? They can be, but the implementation of EIs has certain 
institutional prerequisites of its own. For instance, collection of an emissions charge depends on a 
reasonably effective tax administration, and it also requires monitoring capabilities if charges are 
to be linked, however loosely, to actual emissions. Tradable permit schemes make more onerous 
institutional demands, since they require an institutional machinery for issuing permits, recording 
trades and checking them against actual emissions. Product charges place perhaps the fewest
additional demands on government's institutional capacity.
More generally, the proper implementation of EIs presupposes the existence of reasonably well-
functioning markets and relatively undistorted prices. In many developing countries, and perhaps 
especially in economies-in-transition, prices of certain natural resources, energy and other 
productive inputs are subsidised. Thus, before introducing Pigovian taxes or other economic
instruments, price reform is a prerequisite. While such taxes are designed to internalise marginal 
environmental costs (and user costs in the case of non-renewable resources) in product prices, 
very often those prices fail even to reflect fully the marginal costs of supply (see Pearce and
Warford 1993, Chapter 7). This suggests that resource pricing reform could yield not only 
environmental gains but also allocative efficiency gains (a "no regrets" policy). In practice, of 
course, removal of energy, water or other input price subsidies can be highly charged political 
issues, especially if the equity effects are not adequately addressed. Also, removing distortions in 
one market may not have the desired incentive effects if distortions remain in other markets. For 
example, a rise in energy prices which exerts pressure on industry to invest in new energy 
conserving technologies may not prove effective if they lack access to credit. Similarly, the impact
of the removal of water subsidies to farmers depends critically on whether the prices of their 
produce are also liberalised.
Other institutions may be needed to reinforce the role of markets in the implementation of EIs. 
Not all the information needed by a polluting industry to be able to respond rationally to a 
pollution charge is provided by the market itself. One important piece of information is what types
of abatement technology are available at what cost. While a local supplier industry and market 
may develop for such technologies, before it does access to abatement technology information is 
likely to be limited and costly. Government can provide a valuable service by collecting and 
disseminating such information to local industry, but other institutions like industry associations or 
research institutes may be in a position to perform that function more effectively. 
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The preceding discussion highlights a number of similarities in the policy implementation problems facing 
OECD countries and developing countries. Political opposition to greater reliance on EIs may be an 
obstacle in both groups of countries, though perhaps more so in OECD countries where entrenched
industrial and bureaucratic interests are apt to be stronger. Problems stemming from a weak legal and 
institutional framework are apt to be more serious in developing countries. Both groups of countries 
face similar challenges in matching the policy instrument(s) to the specific characteristics of the problem 
and should be able to learn from each other's experience in this regard.
Following is a distillation of some of the obstacles to and problems in implementation of environmental 
policy which have been touched upon in the preceding pages, with a few observations on how they 
have been or might be addressed. The purpose is to stimulate thought and discussion, not to provide a 
blueprint to policy makers. It should be clear that some of the problems are of a quite general nature, 
applying to regulatory as well as to EI-based approaches, while others are more common with one 
approach than with the other. 
4.1. Ensuring political support 
 
 The political economy of environmental policy is the subject for a book. 
The above examples point to the importance of finding out the likely winners and losers from a 
particular policy before implementation. A transparent political system provides a mechanism for
preference revelation before policy implementation through public disclosure of information, 
public hearings, and public debate. This can help policy makers anticipate the sorts and sources 
of resistance they might face to a proposed policy and to take those into account in revising 
policy design. Of course, policy compromises may have a cost in reduced economic efficiency
and/or environmental effectiveness, but that may still be better than the . A policy 
making process which does not permit such  debate on policy is more prone to 
obstruction of implementation by vested interests.
Political transparency.
status quo






 Transparency can involve risks as well. It has been argued, for 
example, that one reason EIs have not been more widely endorsed -- despite their efficiency properties 
-- is that they make the costs of pollution control (and the distribution of those costs) more apparent 
than is the case with CAC measures. For example, while the consumer may ultimately pay the bill for 
environmental regulation of fossil fuel-burning power utilities, the effect is not as clear as if the 
government were to impose a tax on the sulphur content of fuel. Thus, the consuming public may object 
more vigorously to the tax than the regulation, even if the consumer welfare loss is smaller with the tax.
Transparency of policy impacts.
 Public support for EIs is apt to be greater where 
taxpayers are well-informed about the government's intention in introducing a new pollution tax. If the 
tax is intended exclusively as an incentive device, then a full rebate to the taxpayers (e.g., the polluting 
firms) should neutralise opposition. Assuming the government also intends to raise revenue, then 
earmarking the tax revenues for environmental expenditure enhances transparency, but it also reduces 
Transparency in defining fiscal objectives.
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government flexibility. Where large surplus revenues are not anticipated, this may not be a serious
constraint. One way to introduce an element of flexibility would be to stipulate that, above some 
amount, any additional revenues would revert to the general budget. Where government prefers to 
maintain total flexibility to reallocate revenues from the tax/charge, its broader fiscal objectives should be 
spelled out. For example, does the government intend to maintain overall revenue neutrality, reducing 
distortionary taxes proportionately? If so, even without revenue earmarking, the government may find 
that other expenditures need to be cut if the pollution tax should, by raising the return to pollution 
control investments, cause a diversion of the fixed revenue pool away from competing uses. In the end, 
this effect could be offset by a rise in total revenue via the growth effects of a less distortionary tax 
structure less distortionary via an eco-tax. This points to the need for a general equilibrium analysis of 
any proposed environmental tax with significant revenue implications.
 The government may decide that the introduction of a new policy measure 
like an emissions charge at the national level involves an unacceptable degree of political risk. In that 
event, local experimentation could be a less risky way of testing public reaction as well as determining 
the effectiveness of the instrument. In this way, it could be fine-tuned before an attempt is made to 
replicate it at the national level. It seems highly likely, in most cases, that emission charges or other 
pollution taxes would need some fine-tuning, unless governments are exceptionally well-informed about 
the shapes of abatement cost functions and demand curves. In some cases, a uniform national policy 
would not be appropriate since the problem itself is localised -- e.g., photochemical smog in a particular 
city. Nevertheless, other cities facing similar problems could clearly derive useful lessons from a local 
policy experiment and avenues for transferring those lessons need to be opened where they do not 
already exist (e.g., through a council/conference of municipal or provincial environmental policy 
makers).
Localised experimentation.
 The rationale for phasing in gradually a new measure -- whether stricter standards 
or emission charges -- is to allow incumbents operating with old technology time to depreciate their
investments. In one sense, those with the oldest technologies might be thought to pose the least 
problem, since they are most likely to have depreciated their equipment fully. On the other, the fact that 
they have not been upgrading their technology would seem to suggest competitive weakness and, hence,
vulnerability to additional cost burdens. In many instances, existing facilities are treated differently from 
new facilities in the application of new regulations (e.g., given longer to comply, subjected to less strict 
standards), which may make political sense but also discourages the early retirement of old plant and 
equipment. In applying a new pollution charge, there is no rationale for distinguishing old from new 
sources, since the efficiency of the instrument is a direct function of the degree of variation in abatement 
costs across facilities -- and that depends in no small measure on their relative ages (hence generational 
differences in technology employed). Still, it may be advisable to introduce the charge at a low rate, 
even if that initially mutes the incentive effect. The mere fact of the charge may represent a significant 
policy breakthrough where users and polluters of resources have grown accustomed to their being 
available free of charge. It is important for the government to make clear at the outset that future rate 
increases can be expected and, preferably, to commit itself to a preannounced schedule for such 
increases.
Gradual escalation.
Removing distortions and building institutions 
 Market and policy failures are still fairly commonplace in both the developed 
and the developing world and, arguably, they are especially serious in formerly centrally-planned 
economies. Remedying those failures involves a process of structural reform that extends well 
beyond environmental policy but which nevertheless can have major implications for the 
environment. In particular, the elimination of price distortions in markets for natural resources and 
energy can go some way towards encouraging their more efficient use. Such resource pricing 
Policy sequencing.
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Economies in transition cast in bold relief some of the policy challenges facing other developing 
countries. For example, such economies start from a situation of more pervasive price distortions and, 
as prices are liberalised, they may remain in disequilibrium for some time. Also, it takes time before new 
entry dissipates market power and reduces price distortions in many newly liberalised markets. 
Moreover, an underdeveloped system of property rights can create uncertainties and encourage short-
term resource mining. Thus, even as the government loosens its control over market prices and resource 
allocation decisions, it may need to tighten its grip initially on the regulatory levers. In any event, 
experience would suggest that, even if the eventual environmental policy objective is to rely more on
EIs, building a solid legal and regulatory foundation may need to assume priority in the short run. Where 
pollution damage is already severe, there may be an economic rationale for an initial focus on stricter 
regulation, since the marginal benefits from tighter controls are likely to be high while, precisely because 
of the low initial abatement effort, marginal abatement costs are apt to be low. Later, as pollution levels 
are substantially reduced -- and the marginal benefits of further reductions decline while marginal costs 
rise more steeply -- the advantages of EIs become more apparent.
What is a suitable policy approach for those developing countries which find 
themselves in the enviable position of not having degraded their environments to the point where they 
are left with few alternatives to draconian control measures? In other words, if a government were in a 
position to develop an environmental strategy based on foresight rather than hindsight, what would it 
look like and what place would EIs occupy within it? As the economy grows, the challenge is to prevent
significant deterioration in the environment and there is good reason to believe that a programme based 
on EIs is best suited to that task. For, a key feature of EIs is the built-in incentives that they provide to 
the continued search for ways to reduce pollution levels, whether through changes in product mix or in 
process technology, through end-of-pipe treatment, or by other means. It is the continued impetus to 
pollution-reducing innovation which should ensure the sustainability of the growth process. There is,
moreover, a major difference between the country with foresight and the country with hindsight with 
regard to their abatement cost functions. If it is indeed the case that preventive measures are on average 
less costly than remedial ones, that cleaner process technologies are cheaper than end-of-pipe 
treatment technologies, then the country with foresight should be able to achieve and maintain the same 
environmental quality level as the country with hindsight but at lower cost. Much of the evidence on the
cost advantages of prevention over end-of-pipe treatment is anecdotal and further research is desirable 
in this area.
A preventive strategy. 
Applying economic instruments in an open economy 
As both developed and developing economies have become more open and trade-dependent in 
recent years, the impacts of domestic policy on international trade competitiveness assume 
greater importance in policy debates. Tax policy in general and environmental taxes in particular
are central topics of debate. Variables that may influence the effectiveness of environmental 
policy and its trade impacts include: whether the country is a small economy that has no influence 
on international prices or a large one where a tax might affect international terms of trade; 
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whether affected sectors produce homogeneous or differentiated products; whether substitution
possibilities and possibilities for technological innovation are strong or weak; the mobility of 
factors of production; whether trade agreements allow countries to use border tax adjustments
and other trade measures to reduce adjustment costs; and whether other countries introduce 






 In an open economy, introducing pollution control measures -- whether 
regulations or pollution charges -- which raise costs to domestic producers of tradable may place them 
at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign producers not faced with the same cost burden. This is 
especially so where domestic producers are strictly price-takers in international markets. Where factors 
of production (notably capital) are mobile, the imposition of environmental regulations or taxes on 
domestic industry may also cause a shift of investment -- notably in polluting industries -- towards less 
heavily regulated/taxed locations. The competitiveness effects of environmental policy is a paramount 
political concern in both OECD members and developing countries. 
Effects on competitiveness.
It is not simple to determine   which is likely to have a greater effect on competitiveness -- a 
regulation or an economic instrument. It depends on the specifics of the case and on the type of 
economic instrument. For instance, even though a pollution tax might involve a lower social cost than a 
comparable regulation, it could still have a more adverse effect on competitiveness because of the 
"double burden" it imposes on polluters. Effects on competitiveness will also depend on the fiscal 
impact of the tax -- e.g., if a pollution tax were combined with a reduction in the marginal tax rate on 
capital income or in social charges, its effects would be different than if it were an add-on to existing 
taxes. 
a priori
Empirical studies of the impacts of existing environmental policies on competitiveness generally show a 
weak one. Only in a handful of industries are environmental control costs a high enough share of total 
costs to have had a major impact on competitiveness. While it is the case that the growth of certain 
polluting industries has been much faster in developing countries (generally assumed to have weaker 
environmental standards) than in developed countries, this is true of many less polluting industries as 
well and does not necessarily reflect a response to differential environmental standards. Other factors 
like differences in labour and land costs, access to raw materials and markets are often more significant 
explanations. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that these studies examine the effects of current
environmental policies and not of "optimal" policies that would fully internalise environmental 
externalities.
Even if actual impacts of environmental policies on competitiveness are small, they may still be 
perceived to have large impacts and may therefore pose a political challenge. The case of the US CFC 
tax illustrates the importance of such perceptions (Barthold 1994). While the law authorising the tax is 
non-discriminatory between domestic supplies and imports of CFCs, it authorises the imposition of a 
derivative products tax on imports containing or made with CFCs (on the argument that foreign 
producers of such products should not enjoy a cost advantage by virtue of their access to a cheaper 
supply of CFCs). To tax all such imports, however, even when the amount of CFC involved is 
minuscule, adds significantly to the administrative burden of implementing the tax. Normally, a device to 
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collecting authority to forego collection of inefficiently small amounts of a tax. In this case, however, the 
law specifically prohibits the granting of any   exemptions for electronics products made with 
CFCs, reflecting the political importance attached to the competitiveness of the US electronics industry.
de minimis
de minimis
 The preceding example also raises the issue of a 
possible conflict between a country's environmental objectives and its trade policy objectives. For 
instance, countries that are members of the WTO or that aspire to become members need to consider
whether a particular environmental tax is consistent with the rules of that organisation. For instance, 
while the use of a border tax adjustment on US imports of CFCs and of products containing CFCs 
would appear consistent with WTO rules (see OECD, 1995), the tax on products presumed to be 
made with CFCs is more problematical. From a technical point of view, it is very difficult to ascertain 
how a particular product has been made. More generally, border tax adjustments for domestic process 
taxes are of questionable WTO-compatibility.
Reconciling environmental and trade policies.
Still, governments that are committed to implementing the polluter pays principle (PPP) must accept that 
this will mean higher costs to some industries. While gradualism in implementing PPP may reduce the 
magnitude of the adjustment costs to the economy, such gradualism implies a degree of government 
foresight that seems to be too often lacking. More often than not, environmental control measures are 
implemented under duress and as a matter of urgency only after a problem has become so serious as to 
defy all attempts at deferral.
Once governments accept the likelihood of having to impose costs on polluters, then the issue becomes 
one of choosing the instrument which achieves the desired environmental improvements, if possible at 
least economic cost, but also with the smallest possible adverse effect on competitiveness. Working to 
the advantage of trade-oriented economies is that they are in a favourable position to finance the import 
of new capital equipment incorporating cleaner technologies. With an environmental policy built around 
economic instruments rather than CAC, domestic industries have that much more freedom (and 
incentive) to take advantage of the range of environmental technologies available through foreign trade 
and investment.
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